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Abstract 
 
Jeremiah R. Green: Discretion, managerial incentives, and market conditions: 
The misreporting of hedge fund returns 
(Under the direction of John Hand) 
 
In this study, I document patterns in hedge fund returns that suggest that reporting 
manipulation is significant and pervasive for hedge funds with discretion in valuing their 
portfolios of illiquid assets. I show that hedge funds with such discretion report Sharpe 
ratios that are twice as large as do funds without discretion. I document that manipulation 
extends beyond the small-loss-to-small-gain kink in the pooled distribution of hedge fund 
returns to the shoulders and tails of the distribution. I also find that contractual incentives 
are associated with a larger likelihood of reporting small gains and less extreme returns. 
Finally, I show that funds with the most discretion report monthly returns that are on 
average 0.8% higher than funds without discretion. During market downturns, the 
difference in reported returns between funds with and without discretion increases to 
1.3%. These findings bear on the current debates regarding hedge fund regulation, 
standard-setting for fair-value accounting, and the role of information during market 
crises. 
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 I. Introduction  
The substantial discretion hedge fund managers have in reporting performance 
concerns the SEC, FBI, Congress, practitioners, and the media, who suggest that 
reporting manipulation
1
 is common and problematic.
 2
 However, empirical evidence on 
such manipulation is limited. In this paper, I investigate the extent and significance of 
reporting manipulation by examining patterns in the reported returns of carefully selected 
subsamples of hedge funds that vary in the liquidity of the assets they hold in their 
portfolios. Regulatory bodies have identified asset illiquidity as a potential indicator of 
hedge fund fraud because hedge fund managers may misstate the value of illiquid assets, 
which are difficult to value.
3
  I find evidence of reporting manipulation in patterns in the 
conditional and unconditional distributions of hedge funds’ reported returns that are 
difficult to reconcile with alternative explanations. The results suggest that for funds 
investing in illiquid assets, reporting manipulation distorts the entire unconditional return 
distribution, measures of fund performance such as the Sharpe ratio, the relation between 
                                                 
1
 Throughout the paper, I define manipulation as any reporting action by managers that makes reported 
returns differ from economic returns. This definition for manipulation encompasses deliberate attempts to 
alter reported returns as well as a failure to incorporate information available to managers into the valuation 
of assets. 
2
 http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/march07/hedge_fund.htm, 
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=19024, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint24.pdf, 
http://www.markovprocesses.com/download/mpi_Madoff_Fraud_Analysis_2008Q4.pdf, 
http://kanjorski.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1571&Itemid=114,Aiken 
(2010), Bollen and Pool (2009). 
3
 http://www.fbi.gov/page2/march07/hedge_fund.htm, 
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reported returns and contractual provisions, and the sensitivity of reported performance to 
market downturns. 
In my analyses, I focus on two types of reporting manipulation, specifically, 
overstating returns and return smoothing. Hedge fund managers have incentives to 
smooth reported returns in order to inflate Sharpe ratios—a crucial performance metric 
for most hedge fund managers—and to overstate returns to increase the frequency of 
reporting positive raw returns, consistent with hedge funds’ emphasis in marketing 
themselves as ―absolute return‖ investors. 
Because it is difficult to identify evidence of reporting manipulation empirically, 
and because such evidence may be consistent with alternative explanations, I select a 
subset of hedge funds for which manipulation and alternative explanations produce 
different expectations for patterns in the reported return distribution. Thus, sample 
selection is a critical aspect of my research design. I select and compare subsamples of 
funds investing in the least liquid and the most liquid assets and use the illiquidity of fund 
investments as a proxy for the level of managerial reporting discretion to distinguish 
between managers with varying levels of discretion in valuing their portfolios. I use two 
proxies for the level of portfolio illiquidity, namely funds with a private vs. a public 
equity focus and funds that do and do not have contractual provisions (specifically, long 
lock-up periods and restrictions on investors’ withdrawals) that increase funds’ ability to 
invest in illiquid assets.
4
 Private equity funds invest in start-up companies, leveraged buy-
outs, real estate, and private investments in public equity (PIPES), among other 
investments with relatively illiquid markets.  Unlike private equity funds, which have low 
                                                 
4
 Throughout the paper, I refer to funds with an investment focus on private equity as private equity funds 
and those with an investment focus on public equity as public equity funds. 
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liquidity and thus a high level of discretion, public equity funds have high liquidity and a 
low level of discretion. Similarly, funds that place restrictions on investors’ withdrawals 
are more likely than funds without these restrictions to invest in illiquid assets and to 
have discretion in valuing their portfolios. .  
I use two proxies for the variation in managers’ incentives to manipulate reported 
returns to achieve key performance targets. The first is whether a fund has a ―high water 
mark‖ provision that allows managers to collect performance fees only after prior losses 
are recovered in gains. This contractual incentive provides a strong incentive for 
managers to report gains. The second proxy is whether excess market returns are 
negative. During market downturns, managers have an increased incentive to report 
relatively higher returns to reduce the risk of fund outflows as investors withdraw funds 
from poorly performing investments. 
I evaluate patterns in common outcomes of reported hedge fund performance that 
are likely to influence hedge fund investors’ decision making, are consistent with 
reporting manipulation, and are difficult to reconcile with other explanations. In doing so, 
I answer the following questions: (1) How large is the effect of manipulation on common 
hedge fund performance measures?  (2) To what degree does manipulation distort the 
measured relation between contractual incentives and reported performance (Agarwal, 
Daniel, and Naik, 2009a; Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008)? (3) And how do market 
conditions affect manipulation?  
I first test whether the evidence of manipulation in the pooled distribution of 
hedge fund returns extends beyond the small-loss-to-small-gain kink documented in 
Bollen and Pool (2009). I find that the effects of reporting manipulation extend beyond 
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this kink to the shoulders and tails of the return distribution. Funds investing in illiquid 
assets (high discretion funds), in particular private equity hedge funds,  have fewer than 
expected losses of all magnitudes, fewer than expected large gains, and more than 
expected small-to-moderate gains. Second, I find that private equity funds report Sharpe 
ratios that are two times higher than those of public equity funds and have 7% fewer 
losses, despite expectations based on prior research that would predict the opposite result 
(Cochrane, 2005). Although I cannot directly attribute the difference in Sharpe ratios to 
manipulation, the large difference between funds with more vs. less reporting discretion, 
combined with the other results in this study, suggests that the effects of manipulation 
have a substantial economic effect on reported performance. 
To determine whether manipulation distorts the relation between reported returns 
and provisions in hedge fund managers’ compensation contracts, I examine the effects of 
key contractual provisions on reported returns across the distribution of returns. Agarwal, 
Daniel, and Naik (2009a) find a positive relation between contractual provisions (high 
water marks and long restriction periods on investor redemptions) and performance. 
Using quantile regressions, I relax the assumption that the effect of these contractual 
provisions on performance is constant across the return distribution. Results show that 
high water marks and restriction periods are positively associated with fund returns for 
quantiles of the return distribution with losses and small-to-moderate gains; however, in 
contrast to the evidence in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009a), these contractual 
provisions are negatively associated with returns for quantiles with moderate-to-large 
gains. These findings are more consistent with the effects of reporting manipulation on 
the distribution of reported returns than with a positive effect of discretion and incentives 
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on performance. Further supporting the conclusion that contractual provisions are 
associated with reporting manipulation, results indicate that the kink in the distribution is 
strongest for funds with high water mark provisions. Additionally, I find that high water 
mark provisions and longer restriction periods on investor redemptions have become 
more prevalent for private equity funds in the last years the sample period. Accordingly, 
the kink in the return distribution is strongest in the last years of the sample. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that manipulation is significant because it distorts the 
relation between contractual provisions and reported performance. 
Finally, I test whether funds with greater discretion report higher returns than do 
funds with less discretion during market downturns after controlling for other 
determinants of fund returns. On average, funds with the most discretion report monthly 
returns that are 0.8% higher than funds with the least discretion, increasing to 1.3% 
during market declines. However, there is notably no difference in mean reported returns 
for periods with the most extreme market losses. I conclude that managers use their 
discretion in valuing their portfolios to report relatively better performance, particularly 
during market downturns. However, during market crises managers are forced to 
liquidate their illiquid portfolios, thus providing an observable market price and reducing 
reporting discretion. 
I contribute to the hedge fund literature by providing an upper-bound estimate of 
the economic magnitude of reporting manipulation by comparing the performance of 
funds with the most vs. the least discretion in valuing their assets. This study also 
contributes to the hedge fund literature by showing that the positive relation between 
reported hedge fund returns and contractual incentives documented in Agarwal, Daniel, 
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and Naik (2009b) is distorted by the effects of manipulation such that the relation is non-
linear in the distribution of reported returns. My findings also support the legitimacy of 
concerns raised in recent accounting studies that managers opportunistically mark assets 
to market in order to manage reported performance (Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare, 
2009). Finally, I contribute to the hedge fund and fair-value literatures as well as to 
research on the recent economic crisis by showing that manipulation is likely to be 
greatest during moderate market downturns, but not during the periods of market crisis. 
The evidence from the present study informs current efforts to regulate hedge funds as 
well as the standard-setting debate on fair-value accounting. 
The next section provides background on hedge funds and develops the 
hypotheses tested in this paper. Section 3 briefly discusses recent related research; section 
4 discusses the empirical tests. Section 5 presents the data and section 6 reports the 
results, robustness tests, and several caveats. In Section 7, I present some additional 
analyses, and in section 8 I conclude. 
 II. Background and hypothesis development 
In this study, I examine two types of manipulation: performance smoothing and 
the achievement of salient performance targets (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Because these types of manipulation have been 
extensively studied in prior earnings management research, I only briefly describe them 
here to provide some background on hedge funds and on the application of these two 
types of manipulation to the hedge fund setting. As I argue below, the incentives for these 
two types of manipulation are very strong for hedge fund managers.   
Underlying the discussion is the intuition that manipulation is only possible if 
managers have discretion in setting fair value estimates. Accordingly, I expect the effects 
of both types of manipulation to be greatest for the most illiquid funds. 
2.1 Hedge funds and hypothesis development 
Hedge funds are largely unregulated investment institutions open to institutional 
and wealthy individual investors. These funds typically avoid SEC filing requirements by 
making private placements to qualified investors, which are either individuals with a 
minimum of $1 million in net assets or $200,000 in net income for the prior two years or 
institutions with a minimum of $5 million in net assets.
5
  Hedge funds with assets under 
                                                 
5
 http://www.sec.gov/answers/regd.htm, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule504.htm, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule505.htm, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm  
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management of at least $100 million and holdings of at least 10,000 or more shares or 
$200,000 must file 13-F forms with the SEC.
6
 
Hedge funds have become an increasingly important part of public equity markets 
(Stulz, 2007). These funds pursue investment strategies in a wide range of traditional 
asset classes as well as alternative investments (President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets, 1999). In recent years, hedge funds have also increased their investment in 
markets traditionally dominated by other investors, such as private equity markets 
(Goldstein, 2007). The growth in hedge funds and their role during recent economic 
crises have led to an increase in the call for regulation. 
2.2 Smoothing 
The artificial smoothing of reported performance has long been a concern in 
corporate earnings (Hepworth, 1953; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). Smoothing 
involves intertemporal shifting to reduce the time-series volatility of performance. In a 
cross-section, the effect of smoothing is to reduce the variance of the performance 
distribution. This concern about smoothing has also been expressed in the hedge fund 
setting (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004). Hedge funds have strong incentives to 
smooth reported returns: Common performance measures used to evaluate hedge funds 
are directly tied to return volatility. For example, most hedge fund offering documents 
report Sharpe ratios and return sensitivity to market benchmarks.
7
  Common claims by 
hedge fund managers include that their returns have low volatility, high Sharpe ratios, 
and a low correlation with the market. Funds can improve all of these measures by 
smoothing reported returns.  Because acquiring and retaining investor funds is crucial for 
                                                 
6
 http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm  
7
 Sharpe ratios are a measure of the reward for bearing risk. They are measured as the fund return minus the 
risk-free rate divided by the standard deviation of the excess fund return. 
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hedge funds, and investor flows are sensitive to reported performance, hedge funds have 
strong incentives to smooth returns to improve their Sharpe ratios and other performance 
measures. 
Strong performance measures reported in public databases are one way for new 
funds to attract new investors.  Therefore,  although all managers have an incentive to 
smooth reported returns, the incentive for inflating Sharpe ratios is strongest in the early 
stages of a fund’s life because the youngest funds typically have the greatest need for 
acquiring new investment. 
2.3 Achieving key performance targets 
Prior accounting research has examined managerial incentives to achieve 
reporting targets. Zero earnings (or changes in earnings) has been used in prior research 
as a key target (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).  Hedge funds also have strong incentives 
to report positive returns. The incentive to report positive returns makes exceeding zero 
returns an important target in the hedge fund setting. Hedge funds are often marketed as 
absolute return strategies, and this focus on absolute returns creates an important cutoff 
for funds with pre-manipulation losses. Secondly, a significant portion of hedge fund 
revenue is generated by performance fees. These fees make positive reported fund 
performance crucial to management compensation and even to fund survival (Giannone, 
2009). Also, many funds have high water mark provisions that allow managers to collect 
performance fees only after prior losses have been recovered in gains. These provisions 
align manager and investor incentives (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009a); however, they 
also create strong incentives for managers to exceed a zero-return threshold.
8
 Because 
                                                 
8
 The appendix shows descriptions of the performance fees and high water mark provisions of two 
institutions with underlying hedge fund operations.  
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funds with high water mark provisions must recover losses with future gains, losses 
essentially generate a liability with senior claims on future fund performance. This 
increases the incentive for managers to report positive returns and makes zero returns a 
strong performance target. The incentive to report gains is also particularly strong for 
funds seeking fund inflows. And, similar to the argument for smoothing, young funds 
have an added incentive to manipulate reported performance so that it exceeds the zero-
return threshold. 
An alternative explanation for the effects of high water marks on managerial 
decisions is that as funds fall below their high water mark, managers select riskier 
investments to increase subsequent return volatility (Ray, 2009). An increase in return 
volatility increases the option value of future performance fees. However, Panageas and 
Westerfield (2009) show that this need not always be the case. They demonstrate that 
because the high water mark has an effectively infinite horizon, the performance fee 
contract should be thought of as a series of options on future fees. While increasing 
investment risk increases the present value of the current option, increasing risk in the 
current period also increases the likelihood of falling below the high water mark in the 
future, thereby increasing the strike price of all subsequent options. As Panageas and 
Westerfield (2009) show, under certain conditions, managers do not respond to high 
water marks with greater risk-taking.  
In addition, managers investing in illiquid assets are less likely to make risk-
increasing decisions when their funds fall below high water marks. Illiquid assets, 
particularly investments in private equity, tend to require longer-term investment 
horizons, and thus the ultimate payoff of investing in illiquid assets may only be realized 
11 
 
many periods after the initial investment. Following this argument (and for the setting in 
this paper), it is unlikely that private equity hedge fund managers increase risk in 
response to high water marks. 
As an additional test of the effect of incentives on reporting manipulation, I 
examine relative performance between funds with and without discretion during market 
downturns. Managers face strong incentives to avoid the drain on liquidity caused by 
investor fund withdrawals during periods of market losses. Because fund flows are 
sensitive to relative performance among funds (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009a), 
managers have the greatest incentive to manipulate performance to outperform other 
funds during periods with high risks of fund outflows. Therefore, the incentives for 
reporting relatively higher returns are particularly strong during market downturns.  
If managers with reporting discretion manipulate returns during market 
downturns, while managers without reporting discretion are constrained from 
manipulating returns during these periods, then funds with reporting discretion will on 
average report higher performance than funds without discretion during periods of market 
losses. 
2.4 Constraints 
All managers have an incentive to manipulate reported performance; some 
managers have stronger incentives than others.   However, several institutional frictions 
constrain manipulation. First, concerns about reputation constrain manipulation, leading 
to truthful reporting (Stocken, 2000). Second, litigation and other legal risks constrain 
manipulation (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Heninger, 2001). Third, the large concentration of 
institutional ownership in hedge funds may constrain manipulation (Beatty, Ke, and 
12 
 
Petroni, 2002; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz, 2004). Finally, because large institutions 
measure risk as volatility of returns, large upward or downward manipulations are 
unlikely in the hedge fund setting. 
2.5 Empirical proxies 
For this study, I require proxies for the following constructs: the amount of 
discretion available to managers in determining portfolio values, manager incentives to 
achieve key targets, and manager incentives to smooth performance. As described 
previously, I use measures of portfolio illiquidity as proxies for managers’ discretion. I 
use private equity funds and funds with long restriction periods on investors’ 
withdrawals
9
 to proxy for funds with high levels of managerial discretion. Accordingly, I 
expect smoothing and the achievement of zero returns
10
 to be strongest in these funds. In 
contrast, I expect public equity funds and funds with short restriction periods, which I use 
to proxy for funds with low levels of managerial discretion, to exhibit less smoothing and 
less achievement of zero-return targets.  
Alternatively, the length of the restriction period may also act as a governance 
mechanism, as described in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009b). Longer restriction 
periods may provide a weaker incentive for managers to manipulate performance because 
there is less concern about investor withdrawals. As the present study involves an 
empirical proxy, I can only observe the net effect of these two opposing forces. I validate 
                                                 
9
Two of these important restrictions are lockup provisions and withdrawal restriction periods. Lock up 
provisions set a minimum period from investment in the fund to the withdrawal of the principal invested. 
Restriction periods set the minimum time from the investors’ request for withdrawal to the funds’ 
obligation to return funds to the investor. For managers investing in less liquid, riskier, or longer-term 
investments, lockup provisions and restriction periods reduce the risks associated with the need to exit 
quickly from investments to meet investor demands for withdrawals. 
10
 Throughout the paper, I refer to achieving or exceeding zero returns as the incentive to report positive 
returns. 
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my use of the restriction period in the descriptive analysis below and acknowledge that 
the hypotheses are necessarily two-sided because of these alternative explanations.  
As proxies for the incentives to achieve key return targets I use a sample of funds 
with and without high water mark provisions
11
 and measure relative performance 
between funds with and without discretion during market downturns. While I argue that 
all managers face incentives to inflate Sharpe ratios, I also use fund age as a proxy for 
managers’ incentive to smooth returns and to achieve a zero-return target. 
2.6 Hypotheses 
In figure 1 I presents four hypothetical cases that illustrate expected differences in 
manipulation between samples of funds with different levels of discretion and incentives. 
The figure shows the histograms of observations across these cases, with the fitted curve 
representing the distribution absent any manipulation.  
Case 1:  Little discretion, no target 
This is the base case. If managers have little discretion and lack a salient 
performance target, the distribution is unaffected by manipulation. In this case, the 
empirical distribution and the true distribution are approximately equivalent. 
Case 2:  Little discretion, salient target 
If managers have little discretion, but they have incentives to meet or exceed a 
zero-return target, reporting manipulation is concentrated in the small loss and small gain 
                                                 
11
 Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009a, b) construct a measure of the option value of the high water mark–
performance fee contract. Although the stronger return target is the return that would allow managers to 
collect a performance fee, this target is measured with error and is likely to increase concerns about the 
endogeneity of the relationship between performance and this high water mark target. High water mark 
provisions are set at fund inception and therefore create less concern about an endogenous relationship. 
Additionally, if funds are on average profitable, then the zero-return target is a reasonable proxy for the true 
high water mark target. Ray (2009) measures whether funds are below their highwater mark by estimating 
how far the current period net asset value falls below the historical maximum net asset value. I repeat my 
tests with this alternative measure and find similar results. 
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fractions of the distribution. This is equivalent to the results reported in the earnings 
management research examining a kink in the earnings distribution. 
Case 3:  High level of discretion, no target 
If managers have a high level of discretion, but they do not have an incentive to 
meet or exceed a zero-return threshold, managers will smooth performance to inflate the 
Sharpe ratios but will overstate returns to report gains. In this case 3, because managers 
smooth reported performance, there is a symmetric reduction in the number of extreme 
losses and gains, leading to a more peaked distribution centered on small to moderate 
gains.  
Case 4:  High level of discretion, salient target 
If managers have a high level of discretion and the incentive to meet or exceed a 
zero-return target, they will smooth returns to inflate the Sharpe ratios as well as 
overstate returns to meet or exceed the zero-return threshold. This will lead to a reduction 
in the number of observations in the tails of the distribution as well as a kink around zero. 
In accordance with these cases, I propose the following set of hypotheses. 
H1: Managers with low levels of discretion and a salient zero-return target report 
more than expected small gains and fewer than expected small losses. 
H2: Managers with high levels of discretion and without a salient zero-return 
target report fewer than expected losses of all magnitudes; fewer than expected 
large gains; and more than expected small to moderate gains. 
H3: Managers with high levels of discretion and a salient zero-return target 
report fewer than expected losses of all magnitudes; fewer than expected large 
15 
 
gains; more than expected small to moderate gains; more than expected small 
gains; and fewer than expected small losses. 
H1 through H3 are hypotheses about the distribution of reported returns. The 
hedge fund setting also suggests certain situation-specific incentives for manipulation. As 
described previously, managers have an increased incentive to manipulate returns to 
report relatively higher returns during market downturns. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Managers with reporting discretion report higher returns than managers 
without discretion during periods of market losses. 
Finally, although all funds have the incentive to inflate their reported Sharpe 
ratios, I hypothesize that, as has been found for venture capital funds (Gompers, 1996), in 
the early stage of their life-cycle hedge funds face stronger incentives to manipulate 
reported returns because of the marketing role that their reported returns play in attracting 
additional capital into the funds. 
H5: The younger a hedge fund, the more likely it is that managers with reporting 
discretion will manipulate returns.
 III. Prior research 
Many papers have examined earnings management explanations for the shapes of 
earnings distributions. Burgsthaler and Dichev (1997), for instance, find that there are 
fewer than expected small losses and more than expected small gains in the distribution 
of scaled earnings, thus providing evidence that managers manipulate earnings around a 
zero-earnings target.
12
  
Several recent theoretical and empirical studies have examined characteristics of 
hedge fund contracts with a particular focus on high water mark provisions (e.g., 
Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross, 2003; Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009a; Aragon and 
Qian, 2006; Ray, 2009). Their general conclusion is that high water marks give managers 
an incentive to work harder. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009a) find that funds with high 
water marks and long restriction periods on investor redemptions have higher 
performance. An alternative view, related to the tests in the present study, argues that 
because incentives lead to greater reporting manipulation, the relation between incentives 
and corporate performance may be overstated (Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008). 
The misreporting of hedge fund returns has only recently been studied. Bollen and 
Pool (2009) are the first to examine the distribution of hedge fund returns, documenting a 
kink around zero in the pooled distribution of reported returns for all hedge funds. They 
also observe that manipulation is greater for funds that invest in distressed securities and 
weaker for funds investing in public equity. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009b) test 
                                                 
12
 I discuss critiques of this literature in the caveats section. 
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whether funds with greater incentives and opportunities to inflate returns have return 
spikes in December. They use an estimate of the value of managers’ call options on 
future performance arising from performance fees and high water mark provisions, fund 
performance relative to similar funds, lockup and restriction periods, and flow-
performance sensitivity as proxies for manager incentives for the manipulation of 
reported returns. They also use fund volatility and liquidity as proxies for managerial 
opportunity to manipulate returns.  
Using the same pricing mechanisms employed by hedge funds to value their 
investment positions, Cassar and Gerakos (2009) find that funds that provide managers 
with greater discretion and that use less-verifiable pricing sources have return patterns 
consistent with intentional smoothing.  
 
 IV. Empirical design 
In this section, I describe the three sets of tests: (1) distribution-based tests, (2) 
quantile regressions, and (3) reported performance conditional on market downturns and 
managerial reporting discretion. 
4.1 Distribution-based tests 
Testing the hypotheses about the effects of manipulation on reported return 
distributions requires a benchmark distribution with its associated probabilities. The 
challenge in these tests is selecting a distribution that approximates the distribution absent 
reporting manipulation. I use two approaches to do this.  
In the first approach, I compare the sample distribution of monthly returns
13
 to a 
distribution fitted to the sample after imposing a kernel density estimate.
14  
This approach 
assumes that the true distribution is a smoothed version of the sample distribution and 
that deviations are unexpected departures from the true distribution.  
In the second approach, I use the fitted kernel density of public equity–oriented 
hedge funds as the benchmark. In doing so, I assume that the fitted distribution for public 
                                                 
13
 I focus on monthly returns. However, hedge fund performance fees are typically based on quarterly or 
annual horizons. Therefore, conceptually, a tighter test of the effect of the contractually based incentives to 
manipulate returns would be performed on the returns measured for the same period over which 
performance fees are calculated. Unfortunately, the performance fee period is not available in the data, and 
any arbitrary aggregation of returns would inject noise into the analysis. I repeated the analysis based on 
calendar quarter and annual aggregated returns and reached similar conclusions. The concern about the 
aggregation of returns only applies to the performance fee–related incentives; it does not apply to the other 
incentives to manipulate returns. For the fee-based incentives, monthly returns should display the same 
effects if manipulation is done on a monthly basis rather than across the performance fee period. 
14
 I limit the density estimation to returns between –10% and +10%. This improves the fit of the density 
estimate by not forcing the estimate to fit the extremes of the distribution, particularly when doing across 
subsample comparisons. Altering or removing this cutoff does not materially affect the results. 
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equity hedge funds is an accurate measure of the true return distribution for the 
subsamples used in the tests. This is consistent with Bollen and Pool is (2009) conclusion 
that funds with the most liquid investments exhibit the least evidence of reporting 
manipulation. 
Using the probabilities from the estimated density function, I create standard 
normal test statistics to determine deviations from the ―true‖ fitted distribution (see 
Bollen and Pool, 2009). The standard normal statistic is given by (x-np)/np (1–p), where 
x is the number of observations in the bin, n is the total number of observations, and p is 
the probability from the kernel density estimate fit to the sample of reported returns.
15
 As 
noted in Bollen and Pool (2009), bin width selection is the most important aspect of 
kernel density estimation. I use Silverman’s (1986) rule of thumb to determine the bin 
width. Because there is a large difference in the number of observations between the 
private equity and public equity hedge funds, I adjust the bin widths with a multiplier of 
0.5 for the public equity funds and 2.5 for the private equity funds. This adjustment 
creates an additional correction for differences in the number of observations across these 
samples. The adjustment is also consistent with the finding in Bollen and Pool (2009) that 
the kink in the distribution is less pronounced for funds investing in liquid investments 
such as public equity funds: with the multipliers, the fitted distribution is tied more 
closely to the empirical distribution for the public equity–oriented funds. The adjustments 
also suit the additional tests that use the fitted distribution of public equity fund returns as 
the benchmark ―true‖ distribution.16 
                                                 
15
 Similar to Bollen and Pool (2009), I use a Gaussian kernel. 
16
 Using other multipliers and removing the multipliers produces similar results. 
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For presentation purposes, I set bins to a range of 0.2%, where bin 0 is for 
positive returns at or below 0.2%. This keeps the bin widths constant across the different 
figures. For the same reason, I limit the results to returns +/– 6%.17 In each case, the 
standard normal statistic is created as described above prior to imposing the limits on the 
distribution of the reported figures. Similar to Bollen and Pool (2009), I remove zero 
returns from the distribution analyses. This removes observations with no reported return 
as well as months in which managers do not revise net asset value estimates. I include 
these observations in the other tests. 
For the distribution-type tests, I split funds into subsamples based on the liquidity 
of their investment portfolios (private versus public equity funds, and long versus short 
investor lockup and notice provisions) and on whether a fund has a high water mark 
provision as well as on a proxy for fund age. I use these subsamples to measure the 
effects of the level of managerial discretion and the incentives for reporting manipulation 
(H1–H3). I also split the funds into subsamples based on fund age as an additional 
incentive for managers to manipulate reported performance (H5). 
4.2 Quantile regressions 
In addition to distribution tests, I use quantile regressions to identify non-
linearities in the effects of contractual provisions on fund returns. Quantile regression 
(Koenker and Basset, 1978) has been used extensively in other disciplines and more 
recently has been applied to estimates of hedge fund risk factor exposures 
(Meligkotsidou, Vrontos, and Vrontos, 2009). Quantile regression allows for non-
linearities in estimated regression coefficients across the distribution of the dependent 
                                                 
17
 This restriction likewise applies to bins between –30 and 30. Alternative bin-width choices and bin-width 
windows lead to the very similar conclusions. 
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variable. This approach is conceptually similar to one in which funds are grouped based 
on returns and then OLS regressions are estimated with returns as the dependent variable. 
However, because quantile regression does not impose the distributional assumptions of 
OLS, it avoids the resulting bias in the estimated coefficients. The quantile regression 
approach also permits multivariate tests of the return distribution. 
Hypotheses H1–H3 predict that the effects of high water mark provisions and 
contractual provisions on returns, lockup requirements, and restriction periods will be 
nonlinear in the distribution of returns. The manipulation explanations suggest that for 
the negative portion of returns, high water mark provisions, lockup provisions, and 
restriction periods are positively associated with returns. However, for the large positive 
portion of returns, these contractual provisions are negatively associated with returns. 
These are similar to my earlier predictions related to the smoothing of reported 
performance: the greater the incentives for meeting or exceeding the zero-return 
threshold and the lower the costs of reporting manipulation, the more that negative 
returns are shifted to the positive portion of the distribution and more extreme positive 
returns are shifted to the moderate gains portion of the distribution.  
Two key pieces of evidence, if they obtain, would validate these hypotheses. The 
effect of the contractual provisions on fund returns should be positive for the lower parts 
of the return distribution, and secondly, it should become negative only above the point at 
which upward manipulation becomes less likely.  That is, the point at which the estimated 
effect switches from negative to positive needs to be above the zero-return point and 
should turn negative in the moderately positive portion of the return distribution. 
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This test is similar in spirit to those in a recent paper by Agarwal, Daniel, and 
Naik (2009a), who find that lock up provisions, restriction periods, and high water mark 
provisions are positively associated with fund returns. The results in that study show the 
effects of the contractual provisions on the conditional mean fund return. The quantile 
regression approach tests whether the effects of the contractual provisions differ across 
quantiles of the return distribution. 
4.3 Relative reported performance 
To test H4, the hypothesis that managers with reporting discretion report higher 
fund performance during market downturns than do managers without discretion, I 
estimate a regression of excess returns on an indicator variable equal to one if a fund has 
a private equity focus as a proxy for whether a fund has reporting discretion, and an 
interaction with an indicator variable for periods with negative market excess returns. I 
also control for other variables and interactions. Although this test cannot rule out the 
possibility that funds with greater reporting discretion perform better than other funds 
during market downturns, the hypothesis predicts that in market downturns funds with 
greater discretion will have higher reported performance than other funds because of 
reporting manipulation. 
 
 V. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
The sample comprises observations selected from the union of three large hedge 
fund databases: Lipper/TASS, HedgeFundResearch, and Bloomberg. I restrict the sample 
to funds with either a public equity or a private equity investment focus. I match funds 
across databases on the fund name and fund returns. If the fund name matches either 
exactly or very closely match and the returns also match for at least 90% of the 
observations, then I classify the fund as being covered in multiple databases. For 
multiple-database funds, I use a single return observation for each month. I select 
monthly return observations in the following order: Lipper/TASS,  HedgeFundResearch, 
then Bloomberg. I retain all funds covered in a single database. Fund returns must be 
reported in US$ to be included in this study.  
To determine fund investment focus, I rely on the strategy classification provided 
by the hedge fund databases. I also classify any funds with ―Private‖ in the fund name as 
hedge funds with a private equity focus. I restrict the sample to funds with reported 
returns between January 1, 1995, and September 30, 2009. The sample begins in 1995 
because the hedge fund databases began coverage of inactive funds starting that year, and 
it ends in September 2009 because the most recently available month of data is from 
December 2009. 
Tables 1–3 describe the overall union of the hedge fund databases and the sample 
of equity focused funds that I employ in my tests. There are over 23,000 unique funds in 
the full union of the three databases. Of these funds, the largest number of funds, 9,630 
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(41% of the sample) invest in public equity. Private equity funds (3% of the sample) 
number 630 funds. The smaller number of private equity funds is consistent with the 
predominance of public equity funds in the hedge fund universe, despite recent growth in 
the number of hedge funds focused on private equity investments. The other broad 
categories of investment styles make up approximately 56% of the funds in the sample 
(14% comprising funds of funds). 
Table 1, panel B, reports fund statistics by year. The number of private equity–
oriented funds increases from 154 in 1995 to a peak of 375 in 2005 and declines to 268 in 
2009. The number of public equity–oriented funds increases from 1,162 in 1995 to a peak 
of 5,266 in 2008, declining to 3,388 in 2009. There is a large drop in the number of 
private and public equity fund observations during 2008 and 2009, reflecting the failure 
of a large number of hedge funds during that period due to the credit crisis. The 
percentage of funds with high water mark provisions (PCT HW) increases for all funds in 
the sample to approximately 80% by the end of the sample period. The median wait time 
for investor withdrawal (lockup and restriction periods, MED WAIT) increases from 30 
days to approximately 90 days for private equity funds, while for public equity funds it 
increases to 45 days during the early 2000s and then declines to 31. The changes over 
time suggest that the optimal contractual provisions develop over time. The longer wait 
time for investor withdrawals from private equity funds is consistent with fund managers 
setting these provisions to allow for investments in less liquid markets. This descriptive 
evidence also provides validation for the use of wait time as a proxy for liquidity. The 
smaller percentage of private equity funds with high water mark provisions may also 
suggest that managers and/or investors recognize the differences in the incentives for and 
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costs of manipulation across liquid and illiquid investments and they adjust contractual 
provisions accordingly. The changes in high water mark provisions over time also 
suggest that incentives for manipulation are greatest in the last years of the sample. I test 
this implication in section 7. 
Approximately 35 percent of both private and public equity–focused hedge funds 
are active, while the remaining 70 percent come from funds no longer covered by the 
hedge fund databases (table 2).  This is because they either have been liquidated or have 
chosen to stop reporting returns to these databases. 
Seventy-eight percent of public equity funds have high water mark provisions, 
compared to 57 percent of private equity funds. This contrasts with the finding in Aragon 
and Qian (2009) that less liquid funds are more likely to have high water marks. This 
evidence highlights that at least for a subset of funds, current explanations for the role of 
high water marks are insufficient. It is possible that because investors anticipate the 
substantial discretion of hedge funds investing in private equity, they are less likely to 
require high water marks from these funds. I provide some initial evidence for this 
conjecture in some additional analysis. 
Funds with less liquid investments (private equity funds) have contractual 
provisions that tend to benefit funds with less liquid investments. The mean (median) 
restriction period (RESTRICT) is 61 (60) days for private equity funds and 30 (30) days 
for public equity funds. Lockup provisions are rare in the sample, either because funds do 
not report them to these databases or because they are indeed rare, with quartile 1 through 
quartile 3 values of zero for the public equity–oriented funds and quartile 1 and median 
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values of zero for the private equity–oriented funds. However, the mean value for private 
equity–oriented funds (4.3) is greater than the mean value for public equity funds (2.9).  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the monthly reported returns for the 
pooled return distribution. The mean and median returns of public equity funds are 
similar. This is inconsistent with the notion that, on average, private equity earns a 
premium over public equity because of the illiquidity of the investment. The standard 
deviation of public equity–oriented hedge fund returns is much higher (60.8%) than the 
standard deviation of private equity–oriented hedge fund returns (5.2%).18 Therefore, in 
the pooled distribution, even after the most extreme outliers are excluded, public equity 
funds have more extreme reported returns. This is again inconsistent with the intuition 
that private equity investments are riskier than public equity investments, and it provides 
preliminary support for the hypotheses that funds with managerial discretion smooth 
returns. Drawdown and the percentage of zero-return observations are similar for private 
and public equity hedge funds. The similar frequency of zero-return observations for 
private and public equity funds reduces the concern that the results are driven by less 
frequent valuations by private equity funds. The percentage of negative return 
observations is 30.3% for private equity funds, lower than the 37.4% for public equity 
funds. This evidence is consistent with private equity funds using their discretion to avoid 
reporting losses. Table 3, panel B, reports descriptive statistics for the factors used in the 
regression analyses. 
 
                                                 
18
 Note that the standard deviations are for the pooled distribution and do not represent fund-specific return 
volatility. 
 VI. Results 
6.1 Sharpe ratios and information ratios 
Table 4 reports the monthly Sharpe ratios and information ratios separately for 
private and public equity funds. The Sharpe ratios (panel A) are the mean of yearly 
Sharpe ratios, which are calculated as the square root of 12 times the mean monthly fund 
return minus the one month Treasury bill rate divided by the standard deviation of 
monthly returns. Similarly, the information ratios in panel B are the mean annual 
information ratio, measured as the square root of 12 times the intercept divided by the 
standard deviation of the residuals from a firm level time series regression of monthly 
excess returns on the market premium (MKTRF). The information ratio in panel C is 
measured as 12 times the intercept divided by the standard deviation of monthly excess 
returns on the subset of three factors with the highest adjusted R-square selected from the 
following factors: RET_LAG1, MKTRF, MKTRF_LAG1, SMB, HML, and CHSPREAD. 
Sharpe ratios and information ratios with absolute values greater than 30 are deleted. 
RETRF_LAG1 is the lagged fund excess return; MKTRF is the excess value weighted 
market return; MKTRF_LAG1 is MKTRF lagged one month; SMB is a size factor; HML is 
a book-to-market factor; and CHSPREAD is the change in the yield spread between 
Moody’s BAA- and AAA-rated corporate bonds.  
The monthly Sharpe ratios of private equity hedge funds are greater than those of 
public equity funds at the minimum, 1
st
 quartile, median, and 3
rd
 quartile values (panel 
A). The mean (median) Sharpe ratio is 0.46 (0.5) for public equity funds and 1.09 (0.92) 
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for private equity funds. The difference in Sharpe ratios provides an upper bound on the 
economic magnitude of the effects of reporting manipulation on hedge fund performance. 
As benchmarks for the magnitude of the Sharpe ratios, the market premium, the 
size, and the book-to-market factors all have Sharpe ratios from 0.17 to 0.77 (panel A). 
The economic implications of manipulation are likely to be important because the 
potential manipulation pushes private equity fund ratios above those of benchmarks 
against which fund managers are evaluated. 
Although the Sharpe ratio is a key hedge fund performance measure, it does not 
control for other factors that determine performance. The information ratio removes the 
effects of other determinants of returns from the Sharpe ratio performance measure. After 
controlling for other determinants of fund returns, private equity funds continue to have 
performance measures superior to those of public equity funds (panels B and C). In 
untabulated results, the mean and median differences in Sharpe ratios and information 
ratios between public and private equity funds are significant at the 1% level. In a 
hallmark practitioner-oriented text, Grinold and Kahn (1995) state that an information 
ratio of 0.50 is good, 0.75 is very good, and 1.0 is exceptional. Public equity funds thus 
have good information ratios, and private equity hedge funds have very good to 
exceptional information ratios. Public equity hedge funds have a mean (median) 
information ratio of  0.49 (0.49), compared to a private equity fund ratio of 0.88 (0.61).  
Panel C reports an information ratio that controls for additional determinants of 
fund returns. This information ratio is generated from a model using the three factors that 
generate the highest adjusted R-square for each fund. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 
(2004) note that illiquidity and intentional smoothing generate smoothed returns. I 
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include lagged fund excess returns in the set of possible fund determinants to control for 
the effect of illiquidity on the information ratio. However, any control for illiquidity may 
also remove some of the effect of return manipulation on the information ratio. 
Therefore, the information ratios in panel C represent a lower-bound estimate of the 
effect of manipulation on performance.  Public equity hedge funds have a mean (median) 
information ratio of 0.40 (0.42), compared to a private equity fund ratio of 0.49 (0.55). 
The difference between the information ratios of private and public funds remains 
statistically significant. Even after controlling for other determinants of fund returns and 
potentially removing some of the effects of manipulation, private equity funds have 
substantially and significantly larger information ratios than public equity funds.  
6.2 Public equity–focused versus private equity–focused hedge fund returns 
Figure 2 shows the monthly return distributions of private equity– and public 
equity–focused hedge funds. A kink in the distribution immediately to the right of zero, 
bin 0, is apparent for both the private equity and public equity hedge fund return 
distributions. The bottom portion of the figure plots the standard normal statistic for 
deviations from the kernel density estimates, which are fitted separately for each 
distribution. The horizontal lines indicate significance at the 5% level such that statistics 
above (below) the top (bottom) line(s) have significantly more (fewer) observations than 
expected. The plot shows that the statistic in the small negative bin –1 is significantly 
negative and the statistic in the small positive bin 0 is significantly positive. For the 
public equity–oriented funds the statistic is generally insignificant outside of the small 
positive/small negative portion of the distribution. However, the significant test statistic 
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extends beyond the small negative and small positive bins to the extremes of the return 
distribution for the private equity funds.  
In figure 3, the fitted public equity density estimate is used as the benchmark for 
the private equity empirical distribution. For these results and the rest of the distribution 
results in the paper the standard normal test statistic is created, with the probabilities 
generated by the kernel density estimate for the public equity fund returns. There are a 
significantly larger number of observations than expected in the positive gains and center 
of the distribution, and fewer than expected observations in the tails of the distribution. 
There are also fewer than expected large losses, suggesting that hedge funds do not use 
―big bath‖ manipulation as in the corporate earnings setting. 
This evidence could be viewed as surprising, given the reasonable intuition that 
private equity investments would be expected to be riskier than public equity 
investments, with small probabilities of larger payoffs and larger probabilities of small or 
negative payoffs. The results, however, are consistent with private equity funds 
intentionally smoothing their reported performance.  
6.3 Public equity– and private equity–focused hedge fund results conditional on the 
presence or absence of high water mark provisions 
Panels A and B of figure 4 plot the test statistics separately for private and public 
equity  funds conditional on whether funds have a high water mark provision, which 
creates a strong incentive to exceed a zero-return threshold. For private equity funds, the 
statistic jumps to a significantly positive value at the positive return cutoff for bin 0 
(panel A). However, the statistic for the small negative bin –1 is significant only for the 
funds with a high water mark provision. The statistic is also stronger in the small-to-
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moderate gains for funds with a high water mark provision. Both sets of funds have fewer 
than expected observations in the tails of the distribution. 
Panel B reports the statistic for public equity–oriented hedge funds with and 
without a high water mark provision. The small positive and small negative bins have 
significantly positive and negative statistics, respectively, only for the funds with a high 
water mark provision. The results are less clear for other parts of the distribution. In 
general, the results are consistent with H1–H3 in that they show that funds with lower 
costs of manipulation and funds with high water mark provisions smooth returns and/or 
manipulate returns to exceed the zero-return threshold. 
6.4 Full sample of equity-focused fund results conditional on high water mark provisions 
and waiting periods 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009b) find evidence that funds with high water mark 
provisions and waiting periods (i.e., lockup and restriction periods) have higher returns. I 
use these two selection criteria to create subsamples of funds likely to have differing 
incentives to meet the zero-return threshold and to differ in the costs of manipulating 
reported returns. As in the prior section, I identify funds with and without high water 
mark provisions. To separate funds into groups based on the length of the waiting period, 
I classify funds with waiting periods greater than 30 days as funds with greater discretion 
and funds with waiting periods of less than or equal to 30 days as funds with less 
discretion. Funds with discretion are expected to have shifts from the tails of the 
distribution toward the center-gains of the distribution. Funds with high water mark 
provisions are expected to have a smaller than expected number of small negative 
reported returns and a larger than expected number of small positive reported returns. 
32 
 
Figure 5 reports the results for the full sample of private and public equity 
funds.
19
 The results are consistent with H1–H3. For funds with a high water mark 
provision and low costs of manipulation or greater discretion there is a jump in the 
statistic, moving from significantly negative to significantly positive for the small 
negative to small positive bins.  This is consistent with the shifting of small losses to 
small gains when there is a strong incentive to meet the zero-return threshold. For funds 
with a high water mark provision but less discretion, the only significant statistic is for 
the small negative bin. These results are consistent with the high water mark provision 
providing incentives for managers to exceed the zero-return threshold and with higher 
costs of manipulation, which make more extreme manipulation less likely.  
The kink result is absent from funds without the high water mark provision. 
Additionally, for funds with discretion, the distribution has a greater than expected 
number of observations in the small-to-moderate portion of the distribution and fewer 
than expected observations in the tails of the distribution. The shape is nearly the inverse 
for funds without discretion. The results are consistent with the predicted effects of the 
costs of and incentives for reporting manipulation. The next section reports multivariate 
tests that control for other determinants of returns. 
6.5 Quantile regression 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009a) regress annual fund returns on high water 
mark provisions, wait periods, and other factors and find that high water mark provisions 
and wait periods are associated with higher fund returns.  Table 5 reports the results of 
tests of the nonlinear effects of the contractual provisions predicted by return 
manipulation on fund excess returns. Simultaneous quantile regressions are estimated for 
                                                 
19
 I repeat the analysis with only public equity–focused funds and find very similar results. 
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the 10
th
, 20
th
, 30
th,…90th percentiles of the distribution for the entire sample of monthly 
equity hedge fund excess returns on HW, WAITD, HW*WAITD, RETRF_LAG1, MKTRF, 
MKTRF_LAG1, SMB, HML, and CHSPREAD. I include the interaction term HW*WAITD 
to control for any interactive effect between these contractual terms. Excess returns are 
defined as monthly hedge fund returns minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. HW is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a fund has a high water mark provision; WAITD is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the number of days an investor must wait before 
removing invested capital is greater than 30 days (the sample median), where the number 
of days is equal to the sum of the lockup and the restriction periods; RETRF_LAG1 is the 
lagged fund excess returns; MKTRF is the excess value weighted market return; 
MKTRF_LAG1 is MKTRF lagged one month; SMB is a size factor; HML is a book-to-
market factor; and CHSPREAD is the change in the yield spread between Moody’s BAA- 
and AAA-rated corporate bonds. The risk-free rate, MKTRF, SMB, and HML are 
collected from Kenneth French’s website.  
Consistent with Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009a), at and around the median 
return the high water mark and wait period indicator variables are positive. The estimated 
value of these variables is positive for the lowest excess return quantiles and negative for 
the highest excess return quantiles. Importantly, both values only become negative for the 
parts of the return distribution with positive fund returns For example, HW turns negative 
for the 80
th
 percentile and WAITD turns negative for the 60
th
 percentile. Additionally, the 
difference between the estimates for the 90
th
 and the 10
th
 percentiles is significantly 
different, as estimated with an interquartile regression. This form of nonlinearity is 
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consistent with contractual provisions creating incentives for managers to smooth 
reported returns, incremental to the other factors included in the regressions.  
6.6 Reporting manipulation during market downturns 
Table 6 reports the results from an OLS regression with fund-clustered standard 
errors of excess monthly returns on an indicator equal to one if a fund invests in private 
equity (PVT) and an interaction term with an indicator equal to one for periods with 
negative market excess returns (NEG).
20
 H4 predicts that the interaction term 
(NEG*PVT) will be positive, consistent with greater upward manipulation of reported 
returns during market crises for funds with reporting discretion.  The results are 
consistent with expectations. Private equity funds report 0.8% higher monthly excess 
returns than public equity funds on average. The estimated effect conditional on negative 
market returns (NEG*PVT) is 0.005. Thus, private equity funds report monthly excess 
returns that are 1.3% higher than public equity funds during periods with negative market 
returns. After controlling for other factors, private equity funds report higher returns on 
average than public equity funds, and the difference is statistically greater during periods 
of negative market premiums. Although not definitive, this finding suggests that the 
incentives and resulting reporting manipulation for funds with greater reporting discretion 
are greatest during periods of market losses.
21
  
6.7 Public and private equity focused funds conditional on fund age 
                                                 
20
 Using high water marks and restriction periods as proxies for incentives and fund discretion yield very 
similar results. 
21
 These findings also help address concerns that the distribution-based returns are driven by managers 
allocating total expected returns across periods because market losses represent periods during which 
managers are likely to have additional information about expected returns and therefore should be reporting 
that information in returns. 
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Figure 6 reports the standard normal test statistic separately for private equity and 
public equity–oriented funds for the first 24 months of reported returns and for 
subsequent months of reported returns. H5 predicts that for funds with reporting 
discretion (in this case, private equity funds), the evidence of manipulation is greater for 
funds in the early periods of their life-cycle. The shapes of the return distributions of 
private equity funds for the first 24 and subsequent months of returns are similar, with 
fewer than expected large positive observations (panel A). The greater than expected 
small-to-moderate number of observations is more pronounced for the first 24 months of 
reported returns, and the small negative portion is only significant for subsequent years. 
The kink in the distribution is significant for all months of reported returns (panel B). 
Also, subsequent months of returns tend to have more than expected positive 
observations regardless of magnitude, and fewer than expected losses regardless of the 
magnitude. 
6.8 Robustness 
The results of my tests are robust to alternative empirical choices. They are not 
sensitive to the restriction of the data to any single hedge fund data source; to the use of 
hedge funds investing in both private and public equity rather than funds investing only 
in private equity; to alternative sample selection choices; to the removal of the first 1, 2, 
or 3 years of reported returns; to the division of the sample into the first half and last half 
of the sample in calendar time; to funds with monthly and quarterly management 
payment periods; or to benchmarks other than just public equity funds.  Nor are the 
results sensitive to bootstrapped test statistics; to firm-clustered standard errors; or to 
other specifications of the kernel density estimation, including cutoffs for the inclusion of 
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observations in the kernel density estimation, different bin widths, or different bin-width 
optimization methods. The results are similar for both active and inactive funds.  
6.9 Caveats 
Despite the alternative tests, sample selection, and robustness of the results there 
are a few concerns that may limit the inferences from the results in this paper. First, the 
results may not generalize from the equity-focused hedge fund setting to other hedge 
funds or to the corporate setting. Second, despite the various tests, the inferences may be 
driven by the sample selection problem as described in Durtschi and Easton (2009). 
Finally, the results may be caused by payoff differences between funds with different 
levels of investment liquidity. 
 
 VII. Additional analysis 
The increase over time in the prevalence of high water mark provisions suggests 
that the incentive to manipulate returns in order to avoid reporting losses is greatest in the 
most recent years of the sample. Figure 7 provides some supporting evidence for this 
view. This figure reports the standard normal statistic for the private equity fund monthly 
returns from 2004–2009 benchmarked against the kernel density of private equity fund 
returns from 1995–1999. The figure shows that the small positive range is greater than 
expected during the last years of the sample. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
reporting manipulation is greatest during the most recent period, when the incentive to 
manipulate returns to report small gains is greatest. 
In table 6, I provide evidence that private equity funds report higher returns than 
public equity funds, especially during market downturns. However, during the worst 
market conditions, private equity funds may be forced to liquidate positions, thus 
reducing their discretion in setting fair market values. Table 7 confirms this conjecture. I 
split the sample of returns into 20 groups of months so that each group represents 5% of 
the months, based on the magnitude of the market premium. The difference between the 
public and private equity reported returns is insignificant during months with the 5% 
largest market losses. However, for the other periods with market losses, private equity 
funds report higher returns than do public equity funds. This evidence contrasts with the 
notion that misreporting is likely to be worst during crises periods. A recent paper 
examining discretion in determining bank book values describes this effect: ―Accounting 
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discretion entails the risk of generating highly inaccurate accounting information at a 
time of great turmoil, such as the present financial crisis‖ (Huizinga and Laeven, 2009). 
 VIII. Conclusion 
I provide evidence that hedge fund reporting manipulation is economically 
important. I find that the discontinuity in the distribution of reported returns is greatest 
for funds investing in illiquid investments, funds with high water mark provisions, and 
funds in their first two years of reporting to a public hedge fund database. I also find 
evidence that the effect of manipulation on the distribution of returns extends beyond the 
small negative/small positive returns focus of prior research. I document that funds with 
the most reporting discretion (i.e., private equity funds) report Sharpe ratios that are twice 
as large as those of funds with the least discretion (i.e., public equity funds). The results 
of this study indicate that the positive relation between reported hedge fund returns and 
contractual incentives documented in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009b) is distorted by 
the effects of manipulation such that the relation is nonlinear in the distribution of 
reported returns. This manipulation is shown to be greatest during moderate, but not 
extreme, market downturns for the sample of funds in this study. 
My findings support the concern that managers opportunistically mark assets to 
market in order to manage reported performance. The evidence is important for the 
standard-setting debate on fair value accounting as well as the effort to regulate hedge 
funds. 
This paper provides no evidence on the optimality of these reporting outcomes. 
There may be benefits to allowing reporting manipulation, because doing so can reduce 
the incentives for managers to depart from their area of expertise by making risky 
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investment decisions to achieve reporting objectives. I have documented changes over 
time in restriction periods on investors’ withdrawals and high water mark provisions in 
private equity funds’ contracts. This setting would also be an interesting one for an 
examination of the evolution of optimal contracting in a young, quickly developing 
industry. 
It may also be helpful to make other refinements to the measures I use in the 
current version of the study. For example, it may be useful to exploit variation within 
private and public equity funds in the level of discretion in setting fair values, in the 
magnitude of performance fees, and in measures of the high water mark provision as well 
as other contractual provisions and incentives for reporting manipulation. 
41 
 
APPENDIX  
Performance Fee Examples from SEC Filings (Italics Added) 
OCH-ZIFF Capital Management Group LLC (2008 10-Q) 
―Incentive income, which historically has comprised a substantial portion of our annual 
revenues, is contingent on our funds’ generating positive annual investment performance. 
To the extent any of our funds generate negative annual investment performance, we 
would not earn incentive income for that fund for the year ended December 31. 
Additionally, that fund would be subject to a high water mark in the subsequent year 
which will reduce, and may eliminate, our ability to earn incentive income in that year for 
that fund. The highwater marks for our OZ Master Fund, Ltd., OZ Europe Master Fund, 
Ltd., and OZ Asia Master Fund, Ltd. reset annually on the first day of each calendar year. 
The highwater mark for our OZ Global Special Investments Mast Fund is perpetual.‖ 
The Blackstone Group (2000 10-K)  
―The investment adviser of each of our carry funds generally receives an annual 
management fee that ranges from 1.0% to 2.0% of the investment fund’s capital 
commitments during the investment period and at least 0.75% of invested capital after the 
investment period, except that the investment advisers to certain of our credit-oriented 
carry funds receive an annual management fee that ranges from 1.0% to 1.5% of invested 
capital throughout the term of the fund. The investment adviser of each of our credit-
oriented funds that is structured like a hedge fund generally receives an annual 
management fee that ranges from 1.5% to 2.0% of the fund’s net asset value and for 
general partners or similar entities a performance-based allocation fee (or similar 
incentive fee) equal to 20% of the applicable fund’s net capital appreciation per annum, 
subject to certain net loss carry-forward provisions (known as a ―highwater mark‖)…. 
Our ability to generate performance fees and allocations is an important element of our 
business and these items have historically accounted for a very significant portion of our 
income.‖  
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TABLE 1:  Sample Description 
 
Descriptive statistics of equity focused hedge fund characteristics from the union of three hedge fund 
databases: Lipper-TASS, Hedge Fund Research, and Bloomberg from January 1995 to September 2009. 
Public equity focused hedge fund are defined as funds investing in public equity markets pursuing various 
strategies such as long-short equity, equity market neutral, long biased, or short biased. Private equity 
focused hedge fund are funds investing in private equity markets with various approaches such as start-up 
companies, leveraged buyouts, and private investments in public equity. N Obs in Panel A is the number of 
funds covered in the complete data set. N Obs in Panel B is the number of unique funds covered each 
calendar year. High Water is the percent of funds with high water mark provisions. Wait is the total time an 
investor must wait in days before withdrawing funds from initial investment and is the sum of the lock up 
period, the advanced notice period, and the redemption period. 
 
 
Panel A:  Union of Databases 
 
Strategy # Obs Percent 
Public Equity 9,630 41% 
Private Equity 630 3% 
Convertible Arbitrage 393 2% 
Emerging Markets 826 4% 
Event Driven 1,287 6% 
Fixed Income 1,339 6% 
Macro 2,180 9% 
Managed Futures 1,127 5% 
Multi-Strategy 1,721 7% 
Funds of Funds 3,169 14% 
Other 913 4% 
Total 23,215 100% 
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Panel B:  Private and Public Equity Focused Hedge Funds by Year 
 
 
Public Equity Focused Hedge Funds Private Equity Focused Hedge Funds 
Year # Obs High Water Wait # Obs High Water Wait 
1995 1,162 43% 30 154 20% 30 
1996 1,461 45% 30 208 21% 30 
1997 1,729 48% 30 227 26% 30 
1998 1,983 50% 30 260 27% 30 
1999 2,218 56% 30 270 34% 45 
2000 2,505 63% 30 286 42% 48 
2001 2,746 70% 35 305 49% 60 
2002 3,053 75% 40 307 53% 65 
2003 3,335 78% 45 331 58% 75 
2004 3,764 81% 45 354 63% 90 
2005 4,291 84% 45 375 67% 90 
2006 4,585 85% 45 372 68% 90 
2007 4,919 86% 45 369 70% 90 
2008 5,266 86% 30 349 72% 90 
2009 3,888 86% 31 268 74% 90 
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TABLE 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Private and Public Equity Focused Hedge Fund 
Characteristics 
 
 Descriptive statistics of hedge fund characteristics for the union of three hedge fund databases: Lipper-
TASS, Hedge Fund Research, and Bloomberg. The final sample is the set of funds with a strategic focus on 
public equity or private equity having reported returns from January 1995 to September 2009. Active is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the fund is classified as active by the hedge fund databases. High Water is 
an indicator equal to one if the fund has a high water mark provision. Lock Up is the number of months 
from initial investment an investor must wait before withdrawing funds. Restrict is the number of days 
from the initial request to redeem shares by investor to the redemption of those shares by the hedge fund. 
Sharpe ratio is the mean monthly fund return minus 0.3% divided by the standard deviation of monthly 
returns. 
 
 
Fund 
Type NAME MEAN STDEV P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
Public 
Equity 
Focused 
Funds 
Active 36.9% 
      High Water 77.7%             
Lock Up 2.9 6.5 0 0 0 0 24 
Restrict 30.2 33.9 0 0 30 50 120 
Private 
Equity 
Focused 
Funds 
Active 34.5%             
High Water 56.9%             
Lock Up 4.3 8.3 0 0 0 12 36 
Restrict 60.5 47.1 0 30 60 90 180 
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TABLE 3:  Hedge Fund Net of Fees and Factor Monthly Return Descriptive 
Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics for monthly net of fees return for hedge funds from the union of three hedge fund 
databases: Lipper-TASS, Hedge Fund Research, and Bloomberg. The final sample is the sample of funds 
with a strategic focus on public equity or private equity having reported returns from January 1995 to 
September 2009. Panel A reports statistics of monthly fund returns. RET is the monthly net of fees reported 
fund return. Drawdown is the cumulative return minus the historical cumulative maximum return. Zero 
return is an indicator variable equal to one for observations with returns equal to zero and Neg Ret is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the observation has a return that is less than zero. Panel B reports statistics 
for monthly factor returns over the same period. Rf is the one-month Treasury bill rate, MKTRF is the 
excess value weighted market return, SMB is a size factor, HML is a book-to-market factor, and 
CHSPREAD is the change in the yield spread between Moody’s BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds. The 
risk free rate, MKTRF, SMB, and HML are taken from Kenneth French’s website. 
 
Panel A:  Monthly Fund Return Statistics for Pooled Return Distribution 
Fund 
Type NAME N MEAN STDEV P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
Public 
Equity 
Focused 
Funds 
RET 476,591 0.9% 60.8% -16.3% -1.0% 0.7% 2.5% 17.8% 
Drawdown   -0.23 0.91 -3.01 -0.16 -0.02 0 0 
Zero Ret 
 
0.5% 
      Neg Ret   37.4%             
Private 
Equity 
Focused 
Funds 
RET 48,150 0.8% 5.2% -13.6% -0.4% 0.8% 2.1% 16.3% 
Drawdown   -0.22 0.92 -3.37 -0.12 0.00 0 0 
Zero Ret 
 
0.5% 
      Neg Ret   30.3%             
 
 
Panel B:  Monthly Factor Return Statistics 
 
Variable MEAN STDEV P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
Rf 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 
MKTRF 0.4% 4.7% -16.2% -2.3% 1.3% 3.6% 8.8% 
SMB 0.2% 3.8% -7.5% -2.2% -0.1% 2.6% 13.8% 
HML 0.3% 3.6% -9.9% -1.5% 0.3% 2.0% 12.5% 
CHSPREAD 0.01% 0.13% -0.48% -0.03% 0.00% 0.04% 0.49% 
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TABLE 4:  Performance Measures—Sharpe Ratios and Information Ratios 
 
 Sharpe ratios and information ratios for funds from the union of three hedge fund databases: Lipper-TASS, Hedge Fund Research, and Bloomberg. The final 
sample is the set of funds with a strategic focus on public equity or private equity having reported returns from January 1995 to September 2009. Sharpe ratio is 
the mean yearly Sharpe ratio where the yearly Sharpe ratio is calculated as the mean monthly fund return minus the one month treasury bill divided by the 
standard deviation of monthly returns for each fund. Two versions of an information ratio are reported. The first information ratio is measured as the intercept 
divided by the standard deviation of the residuals from a firm level time series regression of monthly excess returns on the market premium (MKTRF). The 
second information ratio is measured as the intercept divided by the standard deviation of monthly excess returns on the subset of three factors with the highest 
adjusted r-square selected from the following factors: RETRF_LAG1, MKTRF, MKTRF_LAG1, SMB, HML, CHSPREAD. The Sharpe ratios and the 
information ratios are annualized by multiplying by the square root of 12. Sharpe ratios and information ratios with absolute values greater than 30 are deleted. 
RETRF_LAG1 is the lagged fund return, MKTRF is the excess value weighted market return, MKTRF_LAG1 is MKTRF lagged one month, SMB is a size 
factor, HML is a book-to-market factor, and CHSPREAD is the change in the yield spread between Moody’s BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds. The risk free 
rate, MKTRF, SMB, and HML are collected from Kenneth French’s website. 
 
Panel A:  Annualized Sharpe ratio 
  Mean Std.Dev. Min P5 Q1 P50 Q3 P95 Max 
PUBEQ 0.46 2.00 -27.64 -1.97 -0.24 0.50 1.14 2.77 24.92 
PVTEQ 1.09 2.26 -14.30 -0.94 0.36 0.92 1.78 3.77 24.89 
MKTRF 0.77 
        SMB 0.17 
        HML 0.43                 
 
Panel B:  Information ratio with 1 factor (MKTRF) 
  Mean Std.Dev. Min P5 Q1 P50 Q3 P95 Max 
PUBEQ 0.49 1.65 -28.31 -1.51 -0.15 0.49 1.09 2.47 28.38 
PVTEQ 0.88 2.02 -8.15 -1.39 -0.04 0.61 1.28 4.20 20.42 
 
Panel C:  Information ratio with the 3 factors with the highest adjusted r-square 
  Mean Std.Dev. Min P5 Q1 P50 Q3 P95 Max 
PUBEQ 0.40 1.89 -21.20 -1.96 -0.26 0.42 1.06 2.55 28.77 
PVTEQ 0.49 1.56 -11.29 -1.75 -0.17 0.55 1.10 2.75 9.75 
 
  
TABLE 5:  Simultaneous Quantile Regressions of Excess Returns on Contractual Provisions and Factor Returns for Each 
Excess Return Decile 
 
Simultaneous quantile regressions of excess fund returns on explanatory variables. The sample is the union of three hedge fund databases: Lipper-TASS, Hedge 
Fund Research, and Bloomberg for funds with a strategic focus on public equity or private equity having reported returns from January 1995 to September 2009. 
Excess returns are defined as monthly hedge fund returns minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. Reported results are from quantile regression coefficient 
estimates and bootstrapped standard errors. Results for an interquartile regression that tests for differences between the quantiles 0.9 and 0.1 are also presented. 
Quantiles are between 0 and 1 where 0.1 is the 10% quantile and similarly for the other quantiles. Bold type indicates significance at the 5% or better. HW is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a fund has a high water mark provision, WAITD is an indicator variable equal to one if the number of days an investor must 
wait before removing invested capital is greater than 30 days (the sample median) where the number of day is equal to the sum of the lockup and the restriction 
periods, RETRF_LAG1 is the lagged fund excess returns, MKTRF is the excess value weighted market return, MKTRF_LAG1 is MKTRF lagged one month, 
SMB is a size factor, HML is a book-to-market factor, and CHSPREAD is the change in the yield spread between Moody’s BAA and AAA rated corporate 
bonds. The risk free rate, MKTRF, SMB, and HML are collected from Kenneth French’s website. 
 Quantile Intercept HW WAITD 
HW * 
WAITD 
RETRF    
LAG1 MKTRF 
MKTRF     
LAG1 SMB HML CHSPREAD 
Pseudo        
R2 
Low 
Cost , 
High 
Incentive 
0.1 -0.0516 0.0087 0.0173 -0.0114 0.0882 0.4476 0.0439 0.1253 0.0098 -3.3525 11.8% 0.0145 
0.2 -0.0265 0.0046 0.0100 -0.0063 0.0949 0.3407 0.0406 0.0980 0.0183 -2.0919 9.5% 0.0083 
0.3 -0.0135 0.0025 0.0058 -0.0033 0.1053 0.2790 0.0300 0.0855 0.0208 -1.5835 7.8% 0.0050 
0.4 -0.0051 0.0017 0.0032 -0.0017 0.1176 0.2383 0.0200 0.0810 0.0170 -1.3283 6.6% 0.0032 
0.5 0.0016 0.0011 0.0009 -0.0003 0.1290 0.2177 0.0105 0.0831 0.0087 -1.0715 6.2% 0.0018 
0.6 0.0084 0.0007 -0.0015 0.0013 0.1387 0.2133 0.0024 0.0890 -0.0072 -0.7441 6.1% 0.0005 
0.7 0.0167 0.0002 -0.0043 0.0031 0.1491 0.2259 -0.0061 0.1004 -0.0271 -0.1983 6.3% -0.0010 
0.8 0.0297 -0.0013 -0.0092 0.0067 0.1599 0.2535 -0.0122 0.1198 -0.0494 0.4018 6.8% -0.0038 
0.9 0.0545 -0.0033 -0.0153 0.0108 0.1665 0.3155 -0.0228 0.1592 -0.0794 1.3122 7.2% -0.0079 
             
Interquartile Regression (0.9-0.1)             
  
  Intercept HW WAITD 
HW * 
WAITD 
RETRF    
LAG1 MKTRF 
MKTRF     
LAG1 SMB HML CHSPREAD 
  0.9-0.1 0.1061 -0.0119 -0.0326 0.0221 0.0783 -0.1322 -0.0667 0.0339 -0.0892 4.6646 
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TABLE 6:  Panel Regression of Excess Returns on Factor Returns Conditional on 
the Sign of the Market Premium  
 
Panel regression of excess fund returns on explanatory variables. The sample is the union of three hedge 
fund databases: Lipper-TASS, Hedge Fund Research, and Bloomberg for funds with a strategic focus on 
public equity or private equity having reported returns from January 1995 to September 2009. Excess 
returns are defined as monthly hedge fund returns minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (RETRF). 
Reported results are from OLS coefficient estimates and t-values based on standard errors clustered by 
fund. MKTRF is the excess value weighted market return, MKTRF_LAG1 is MKTRF lagged one month, 
SMB is a size factor, HML is a book-to-market factor, and CHSPREAD is the change in the yield spread 
between Moody’s BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds. The risk free rate, MKTRF, SMB, and HML are 
collected from Kenneth French’s website. NEG is an indicator variable equal to one if MKTRF is less than 
one, _LAG1 indicates one month lagged values. RETVOL is the lagged 6 month standard deviation of 
monthly returns. 
 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. 
Est. T Value 
Intercept 
 
-0.039 -1.8 
MKTRF + 0.073 0.6 
NEG - -0.007 -4.1 
MKTRF*NEG + 0.470 1.9 
PVT + 0.008 2.0 
MKTRF*PVT - -0.041 -0.9 
NEG * PVT + 0.005 3.7 
MKTRF*NEG *PVT ? -0.015 -0.2 
MKTRF_LAG1 0 -0.092 -1.2 
NEG_LAG1 - -0.012 -2.8 
MKTRF_LAG1*NEG_LAG1 + 0.147 1.3 
MKTRF_LAG1*PVT + 0.044 1.3 
NEG_LAG1* PVT + 0.004 2.5 
MKTRF_LAG1*NEG_LAG1*PVT ? 0.029 0.7 
CHSPREAD - -0.915 -1.5 
SMB + 0.055 1.5 
HML + -0.142 -3.4 
RETRF_LAG1 + 0.019 1.2 
RETVOL + 1.674 2.1 
Adj. Rsquare     44.7% 
N Obs 
  
488,062 
Fund Clustered Standard Errors N Clusters 
 
7761 
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TABLE 7:  T-Tests for Differences in Means between Public Equity and Private 
Equity Funds by Levels of Market Premium  
 
T-tests for differences in mean monthly net of fees returns between public equity and private equity 
focused funds between January 1995 and September 2009. RMKTRF is the ranked excess value weighted 
market return such that a value of 1 indicates the months with the lowest 5% of monthly market premiums.  
 
 
Mean Values Difference   
RMKTRF 
Public 
Equity 
Funds 
Private 
Equity 
Funds 
Public-
Private 
Equity 
Funds tValue 
1 -4.0% -3.6% -0.4% -1.8 
2 -1.6% -1.1% -0.6% -4.7 
3 -0.9% -0.2% -0.7% -5.0 
4 -1.0% -0.7% -0.4% -2.9 
5 -0.5% -0.1% -0.3% -4.2 
6 0.1% 0.3% -0.2% -2.4 
7 -0.5% 0.2% -0.6% -6.5 
8 0.1% 0.6% -0.4% -4.4 
9 0.9% 0.8% 0.1% 0.5 
10 1.0% 1.2% -0.2% -2.7 
11 -0.3% 0.2% -0.5% -3.3 
12 1.3% 1.2% 0.1% 1.4 
13 1.9% 1.7% 0.2% 2.3 
14 2.4% 1.7% 0.7% 3.0 
15 2.4% 2.1% 0.3% 2.8 
16 3.1% 2.4% 0.6% 0.4 
17 2.9% 2.6% 0.3% 2.6 
18 2.8% 1.6% 1.2% 6.4 
19 3.4% 2.5% 0.9% 6.5 
20 6.0% 2.8% 3.1% 0.4 
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FIGURE 1:  The Effects of Costs of and Incentives for Reporting Manipulation on 
the Distribution of Reported Performance 
                Returns 
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FIGURE 2:  Distributions of Monthly Returns for Public vs. Private Equity Focused 
Hedge Funds 
 
The distributions of monthly hedge fund returns and the statistical significance of the unexpected number 
of observations in each histogram bin for funds with a public equity vs. private equity investment focus. 
Bins are set to a range of 0.2% and bin 0 is for 0 <  returns  < = 0.2%. A vertical line is drawn at the zero 
return point. Zero returns omitted from the analysis. 
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FIGURE 2 Panel C  
 
Statistical significance is determined by the standard normal statistic (x-np) / np (1-p) where x is the 
number of observations in the bin, n is the total number of observations and p is the probability of the 
kernel density estimate fit to the sample of reported returns. Vertical lines mark the cutoff for significance 
at the 5% level. The kernel density estimate is estimated with a Gaussian density as the kernel with the 
Silverman (1986) bin width selection and adjustments to the bin width using band width multipliers of 2.5 
for private equity funds and 0.5 for public equity funds. 
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FIGURE 3:  Standard Normal Statistic for Private Equity Focused Hedge Fund 
Distribution Benchmarked Against the Kernel Density Estimate of Public Equity 
Focused Hedge Funds 
 
Private equity focused hedge fund reported returns minus the expected number of returns from a kernel 
density estimate of the return distribution of public equity oriented hedge funds. Bins are set to a range of 
0.2% and bin 0 is for 0 <  returns  < = 0.2%. Statistical significance is determined by the standard normal 
statistic (x-np) / np (1-p) where x is the difference between the private equity and public equity number of 
observations in the bin, n is the total number of observations and p is the probability of the kernel density 
estimate fit to the sample of public equity hedge fund reported returns. Vertical lines mark the cutoff for 
significance at the 5% level. The kernel density estimate is estimated with a Gaussian density as the kernel 
with the Silverman (1986) bin width selection and adjustments to the bin width using a band width 
multiplier of 0.5. 
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FIGURE 4:  Standard Normal Statistic for Private and Public Equity Focused 
Hedge Fund Distributions Benchmarked Against the Kernel Density Estimate of 
Public Equity Focused Hedge Funds for Funds with and without High Water Mark 
Provisions 
 
Private equity (Panel A) and public equity (Panel B) hedge fund reported returns, separately for funds with 
and without high water mark provisions, minus the expected number of returns from a kernel density 
estimate of the return distribution of public equity hedge funds. Bins are set to a range of 0.2% and bin 0 is 
for 0 <  returns  < = 0.2%. Statistical significance is determined by the standard normal statistic (x-np) / np 
(1-p) where x is the difference between the private equity and public equity number of observations in the 
bin, n is the total number of observations and p is the probability of the kernel density estimate fit to the 
sample of public equity hedge fund reported returns. Vertical lines mark the cutoff for significance at the 
5% level. The kernel density estimate is estimated with a Gaussian density as the kernel with the Silverman 
(1986) bin width selection and adjustments to the bin width using a band width multiplier of 0.5.  
 
PANEL A:  Public Equity Focused Hedge Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PANEL B:  Private Equity Focused Hedge Funds 
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FIGURE 5:  Standard Normal Statistic of 2X2 for the Full Private and Public 
Equity Focused Sample with and without High Water Mark Provision and High / 
Low Costs of Reporting Manipulation 
 
Hedge fund reported returns, separately for the following groups: funds with high water mark provisions 
and with total redemption wait time (lockup + restriction periods) greater than 45 days, high water mark 
and total wait time less than or equal to 45 days, and similarly for no high water mark provisions and 
greater / less than or equal to 30 days, minus the expected number of returns from a kernel density estimate 
of the return distribution of public equity oriented hedge funds. Bins are set to a range of 0.2% and bin 0 is 
for 0 <  returns  < = 0.2%. Statistical significance is determined by the standard normal statistic (x-np) / np 
(1-p) where x is the difference between the private equity and public equity number of observations in the 
bin, n is the total number of observations and p is the probability of the kernel density estimate fit to the 
sample of public equity hedge fund reported returns. Vertical lines mark the cutoff for significance at the 
5% level. The kernel density estimate is estimated with a Gaussian density as the kernel with the Silverman 
(1986) bin width selection and adjustments to the bin width using a band width multiplier of 0.5. 
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FIGURE 6:  Standard Normal Statistic for Private and Public Equity Focused 
Hedge Fund Distributions Benchmarked Against the Kernel Density Estimate of 
Public Equity Focused Hedge Funds for Funds in First 2 Years of Reporting and for 
3+ years of Reporting 
 
Private equity (Panel A) and public equity (Panel B) hedge fund reported returns, separately for the first 24 
months of reported fund returns and for subsequent months, minus the expected number of returns from a 
kernel density estimate of the return distribution of public equity oriented hedge funds. Bins are set to a 
range of 0.2% and bin 0 is for 0 <  returns  < = 0.2%. Statistical significance is determined by the standard 
normal statistic (x-np) / np (1-p) where x is the difference between the private equity and public equity 
number of observations in the bin, n is the total number of observations and p is the probability of the 
kernel density estimate fit to the sample of public equity hedge fund reported returns. Vertical lines mark 
the cutoff for significance at the 5% level. The kernel density estimate is estimated with a Gaussian density 
as the kernel with the Silverman (1986) bin width selection and adjustments to the bin width using a band 
width multiplier of 0.5.  
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FIGURE 7:  Standard Normal Statistic for Private Equity Focused Hedge Fund 
Distribution from 2004 to 2009 Benchmarked Against the Kernel Density Estimate 
of Private Equity Focused Hedge Funds from 1995 to 1999 
 
Private equity focused hedge fund reported returns from 2004 to 2009 minus the expected number of 
returns from a kernel density estimate of the return distribution of private equity focused hedge funds from 
1995 to 1999. Bins are set to a range of 0.2% and bin 0 is for 0 <  returns  < = 0.2%. Statistical significance 
is determined by the standard normal statistic (x-np) / np (1-p) where x is the difference between the private 
equity number of observations in the bin, n is the total number of observations and p is the probability of 
the kernel density estimate fit to the sample of returns from 1995 to 1999. Vertical lines mark the cutoff for 
significance at the 5% level. The kernel density estimate is estimated with a Gaussian density as the kernel 
with the Silverman (1986) bin width selection and adjustments to the bin width using a band width 
multiplier of 2.5. 
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